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When Opel invested in car assembly operations in Gliwice in 1998, Poland registered 
this project as German because Opel is headquartered in, and managed from, 
Germany. However Opel has been owned by General Motors (United States) since 
1929. Such utilization of foreign affiliates for investment in third countries is “indirect 
foreign direct investment” (indirect FDI). At first sight the term is contradictory, 
although it is not so: “direct” refers to the degree of control over a foreign affiliate, 
while “indirect” denotes the way the ultimate owner arrives at such control. 
 
Indirect FDI matters for host countries because an investor follows a distinct 
corporate strategy, which is influenced by the management culture of the investor’s 
home country. If projects are transparent, host countries face few problems with 
indirect FDI. There are however cases in which the ultimate owners conceal their 
identities to circumvent sensitivities about their nationalities, such as Russian firms 
investing through Cyprus. A special form of indirect FDI is round tripping: the 
ultimate owners come from the same country in which the foreign affiliates are 
located. Round tripping is important for example between China and Hong Kong 
(China) and between the Russian Federation and Cyprus. Indirect FDI can be financed 
through transshipment investment by using foreign affiliates in third countries or more 
transient constructions such as special purpose entities (SPEs).1 SPEs are 
concentrated in hubs, such as Luxembourg, Austria and Hungary, in that order. 
 
Indirect FDI distorts global FDI statistics (see the tables below), although it reflects 
well corporate financial strategies. In part due to round tripping, host countries’ 
statistics provide a misleading picture of the geography of FDI. For example, FDI by 
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 An SPE is a separate legal person established to pursue temporary objectives such as the financing of 
an affiliate abroad. Different from ordinary projects, it allows limiting the risk of the transaction to the 
value of the SPE. 
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ultimate owners is reported by a handful of countries only. In one of them, the United 
States, the immediate and ultimate owners were different in at least 18% of inward 
FDI projects (in terms of value of investment) in 2010. UNCTAD data indicate that 
other countries provide less perfect proxies of the extent of indirect FDI.2 For 
example, in 2008, 60% of the outward FDI stock of Brazil was registered in three 
Caribbean offshore centers, to be transshipped to third countries. For the Russian 
Federation, Cyprus accounted for 30% of the outflows and 22% of the inflows over 
the period 2007-2011; for Hong Kong, China accounted for 37% of the inward stock 
and 42% of the outward stock in 2010. Finally, the combined inward and outward FDI 
stocks of each Austria, Hungary and Luxembourg in SPEs topped US$ 1.7 trillion in 
2010 and their ratios to global FDI stocks exceeded 8%. 
 
Companies undertake indirect FDI for various reasons. The most important is 
corporate strategy, that is, delegating investment decisions in third countries to 
geographically close regional headquarters or to foreign affiliates with cultural 
affinity. For example, multinational enterprises ask their Slovenian affiliates to invest 
in the Balkans, due to their better understanding of local business conditions. 
Delegation to foreign affiliates may also make sense for managing global value 
chains. Tax advantages are another key consideration, since lower taxes can result 
from transshipment through financial centers and investment through countries that 
have favorable double taxation treaties (DTTs) with the target host country. Taxation 
matters also for round tripping: a company that is registered as foreign can benefit 
from incentives, and can also invoke the DTT signed with the transshipment country. 
Some firms undertaking capital-intensive and risky projects use indirect FDI to obtain 
protection from the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of transit countries. As 
indicated, there are also firms that wish to conceal their origins as much as possible in 
order to avoid scrutiny by the host country. For round tripping, escaping from 
potential uncertainties in the country of origin could also be a motive. 
 
Indirect FDI has implications for development. Ultimate owners have a say in the 
operations of the affiliates they control indirectly. Indirect FDI influences the amount 
and distribution of taxes among countries. It also leverages protection for investors 
and can provide better access to dispute settlement. Finally, when there are 
sensitivities about ultimate investors, national security considerations may arise. 
 
In principle, host countries could formulate an effective policy response because often 
their own regulatory systems encourage indirect FDI. They need not fully suppress 
indirect FDI but rather deal with its negative consequences. Tax laws encouraging 
indirect FDI leading to welfare losses could be revised, especially through 
cooperation of the jurisdictions concerned. International action on transfer pricing also 
needs to be strengthened. The role of BITs and DTTs needs to be revaluated. Treaty 
shopping is difficult to contain; but one could envisage clauses limiting the 
importation of protections from other BITs, following the example of exemptions to 
the most-favored-nation clause. Policy makers could also consider BIT clauses on 
transparency regarding ultimate owners. 
 
The material in this Perspective may be reprinted if accompanied by the following acknowledgment: 
“Kalman Kalotay, ‘Does it matter who invests in your country?,’ Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 66, 
April 30, 2012. Reprinted with permission from the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International 
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Investment (www.vcc.columbia.edu).” A copy should kindly be sent to the Vale Columbia Center at 
vcc@law.columbia.edu. 
 
For further information please contact: Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, 
Jennifer Reimer, jreimer01@gmail.com or jreimer@lyhplaw.com. 
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 Table 1. Inward FDI stock of the United States from selected economies of origin, by immediate 
investor and ultimate beneficial owner, 2010 
(Billions of dollars) 





beneficial owner Difference 
Bermuda 5.1 124.8 119.7 
United Kingdom 432.5 497.5 65.0 
Germany 212.9 257.2 44.3 
Canada 206.1 238.1 31.9 
United States – 31.6 31.6 
Ireland 30.6 61.7 31.1 
France 184.8 209.7 24.9 
Mexico 12.6 34.0 21.4 
Brazil 1.1 15.5 14.4 
United Arab Emirates 0.6 13.3 12.7 
Israel 7.2 19.5 12.2 
Belgium 43.2 52.2 9.0 
Netherlands Antilles 3.7 12.4 8.7 
Hong Kong (China) 4.3 11.6 7.3 
Italy 15.7 23.0 7.3 
Japan 257.3 263.2 6.0 
Norway 10.4 14.4 4.1 
India 3.3 7.1 3.8 
Spain 40.7 44.2 3.5 
Finland 6.6 10.0 3.5 
Australia 49.5 52.9 3.4 
New Zealand 0.6 3.3 2.7 
China 3.2 5.8 2.7 
South Africa 0.7 2.2 1.5 
Korea, Republic of 15.2 16.6 1.4 
Kuwait 0.3 1.5 1.1 
Taiwan Province of China  5.2 6.0 0.8 
Malaysia 0.4 1.0 0.6 
Denmark 9.3 9.9 0.6 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 2.9 3.1 0.3 
Bahamas 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Total difference (+) - - 477.7 
Singapore 21.8 21.3 -0.5 
Panama 1.5 0.8 -0.7 
Austria 4.4 2.5 -1.8 
Sweden 40.8 36.0 -4.7 
United Kingdom Islands, Caribbean 31.2 0.8 -30.3 
Netherlands 217.1 118.2 -98.8 
Switzerland 192.2 61.6 -130.6 
Luxembourg 181.2 24.4 -156.8 
Total difference (-) – – -424.4 
All economies 2 342.8 2 342.8 – 
    
Source: The author's calculations, based on U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data.  
Note: Data for various economies have been suppressed; therefore the total value of differences (+) and 
(-) differ. 
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Table 2. SPE and non-SPE related FDI stocks of Austria, Hungary and Luxembourg, 2010  
(Stocks in billions of US$ and shares in %) 
        














Ratio of SPE 
to non-SPE 
(%) 
Austria 170 103 166  177 98 180 
Hungary 120 89 134  122 20 623 
Luxembourg 1 579 287 551  1 403 499 281 
Total 1 869 479 390  1 702 617 276 
Memorandum item:       
Ratio to world 
FDI stock (%)a 9.77       8.34     
        
Source: The author's calculations, based on UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database, and national statistics. 
a
 Global FDI stock data usually exclude SPEs. 
 
